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Forthcoming Changes in the Shari'ah Compliance Regime for Islamic
Finance. By Scott R. Anderson
I. INTRODUCTION
Three decades ago, many saw Islamic finance as something of an
oxymoron. Religious prohibitions on the collection of interest (riba) and
speculative investment (gharar) seemed to stand in clear tension with modem
economic practices, limiting Muslim consumers' ability to engage in
worldwide financial markets.' But subsequent years of innovation have
yielded financial instruments and services that are able to reproduce many of
the benefits of conventional finance without violating the tenets of Islamic
law, or shari'ah.2 Increasingly popular among Muslim and non-Muslim
issuers alike, these Islamic financial products are estimated to be worth as
much as $822 billion worldwide, making them a significant part of the global
financial system. 3 This rapid growth has not come without controversy. Critics
have charged that ostensibly shari'ah-compliant products often mimic
conventional financial products too closely, compromising the ethical
principles served by riba and gharar restrictions. These disputes over shari 'ah
compliance have at times deterred Muslim consumers from purchasing
disputed products and limited how broadly the products can be effectively
marketed across the Islamic world.
This Recent Development examines the plan that one prominent
organization, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial
Institutions (AAOIFI), has recently put into motion to address these problems,
wherein it assumes an unprecedented regulatory role in reviewing the shari 'ah
compliance of products industry-wide. To place this plan into perspective,
Part II provides background on interpretive debates within Islamic finance,
while Part III describes the industry's current decentralized system for
ensuring shari'ah compliance. Part IV details the AAOIFI's plan and
considers how it reflects other actions that the AAOIFI has taken to address
recent shari'ah compliance controversies. Part V concludes that, while the
AAOIFI's new authority should help promote convergence in shari'ah
compliance standards, it may also slow innovation and ultimately fragment
Islamic financial markets if applied too aggressively. To avoid this outcome,
1. For a more complete description of these restrictions, see FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L.
HAYES, 1II, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK, AND RETURN 71-93 (1998). Other Islamic
principles encourage trade by mutual consent, promote commercial probity, emphasize the freedom of
contract, and prohibit participation in immoral activities such as the production of alcohol or
pornography. See id. at 53-69.
2. The term shari 'ah technically refers to God's infallible divine law, while the rules that
imperfect individuals develop in attempting to divine and interpret shari 'ah are referred to asfiqh. While
most Islamic finance rules should properly be defined asfiqh, see id. at 23-24, this piece refers to them
collectively as shari 'ah.
3. Islamic Banking Assets Continue Double-Digit Growth: Survey, PENINSULA (Doha), Nov.
6, 2009, http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com (search for "Islamic banking assets growth").
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the AAOIFI should retain its historical commitment to gradual change and
consensus-building as it approaches its new responsibilities.
II. DEBATING SHARI'AH COMPLIANCE
Understanding the significance of the AAOIFI's recent actions requires
some basic background on the interpretive debates surrounding shari'ah
compliance. At its core, modem Islamic finance is built upon several
"nominate contracts," including cost-plus sales (murabaha), leases (Qjara),
advance purchases (salam), silent partnerships (mudaraba), and full
partnerships (musharaka).4 Each of these types of contract is accepted as
legitimate under Sunni Islamic doctrine, either because it appears in the
religion's holy texts or because it has been clearly approved of by prior
generations of Islamic scholars. 5 Contemporary scholars often justify these
contracts on the more pragmatic grounds that they link investors' returns to
tangible assets, encourage risk-sharing, and otherwise discourage riba and
6gharar in a manner consistent with shari 'ah.
Modem financiers have found ways of using these nominate contracts
that simulate many of the characteristics of conventional financial products,
allowing them to capture Muslim consumers in what some cynically call
"shari'ah arbitrage." 7 For example, through a murabaha contract, a consumer
may ask a bank to make a purchase on his behalf on the condition that he later
repay the cost plus an additional fee. If this fee is benchmarked to prevailing
interest rates, then the transaction has the same economic effect as a
conventional interest-bearing loan. While the bank retains ownership and its
associated risks until repayment, use of the item purchased can be provided
through an accompanying ijara lease or other arrangement. 8 Complex
products, such as so-called "Islamic bonds," or sukuk, often use several layers
of nominate contracts, alongside special purpose corporate entities and other
measures. In the case of sukuk, these help simulate the fixed payments and
reliable returns on principal provided by conventional debt instruments.
9
Defenders of shari'ah arbitrage typically rely on a classical formalist
approach to Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, which gives great precedential
weight to previously approved legal structures and practices. Because each
4. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 1, at 138-50, 181-200. While Shi'a Islam has its own
interpretive approach to Islamic finance issues, this analysis limits itself to the more prevalent branch of
Sunni Islam. For a brief comparison of Sunni and Shi'a approaches, see MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL,
ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS AND PRACTICE 19-20 (2006).
5. See EL-GAMAL, supra note 4, at 17-19.
6. See, e.g., MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE, at xiv-xvii
(2002).
7. EL-GAMAL, supra note 4, at 75.
8. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 1, at 140-45. For additional examples along these lines,
see EL-GAMAL, supra note 4, at 3-7.
9. See Michael J.T. McMillen, Asset Securitization Sukuk and Islamic Capital Markets:
Structural Issues in These Formative Years, 25 WIS. INT'L L.J. 703, 749-58 (2008) (describing the
structures of several complex sukuk arrangements).
10. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 1, at 42-44 (describing the "casuistic style" of classical
Sunni legal reasoning). But see Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On
the Necessity of Realism in the Study of Islamic Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 423 (2008) (arguing that the
formalist emphasis on classical doctrine serves a largely rhetorical function).
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nominate contract has been accepted as shari'ah-compliant in the past, these
individuals argue that even complex arrangements of them must be compliant
as well, so long as they conform with the previously approved forms.11 Many
critics, however, maintain that shari'ah compliance should be judged by a
product's functional impact on society as compared to shari'ah principles of
social justice and risk sharing. 12
Sunni Islam has little formal hierarchy for resolving such doctrinal
disputes. 13 Consequently, this formalist-functionalist tension and other
interpretive debates play out between Islamic scholars whenever they debate
the shari'ah compliance of particular products, often leading to divergent
interpretations. 14 For some, this lack of clear standards raises fears that
scholars may at times neglect their obligation to interpret in good faith, and
simply use whatever bundle of authorities allows them to justify their
preferred outcome. 15 Such concerns are particularly relevant to lay Muslim
consumers, who are generally seen as lacking the authority and expertise
necessary to determine independently the legitimacy of scholars' rulings., 
6
III. MANAGING SHARfAH COMPLIANCE RISK
Where Islamic scholars disagree on the shari'ah compliance of a given
product, consumers often limit themselves to products approved by their local
scholars or simply avoid disputed products altogether. As disagreements over
shari'ah compliance hinder products' sales and overall economic
performance, both reactions expose banks, state treasuries, and other financial
institutions that deal in Islamic financial products to what one scholar calls
"shari'ah compliance risk." 17 To reduce this risk, these Islamic financial
institutions have worked to find ways to minimize public disagreement and
collaborate toward commonly accepted standards.
Most of the responsibility for ensuring shari'ah compliance lies with
panels of Islamic scholars and finance experts called shari'ah supervisory
boards. Located within Islamic financial institutions, these boards work with
an institution's staff to develop, review, and supervise financial products to
ensure that they abide by shari 'ah requirements. Ultimately, it is these boards'
approval that signals to Muslim consumers that a given product is shari'ah-
compliant. To convince as broad a swathe of Muslim consumers as possible to
11. See Ayman A. Abdel-Khaleq & Christopher F. Richardson, New Horizons for Islamic
Securities: Emerging Trends in Sukuk Offerings, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 409, 411-13 (2007); Shaykh Yusuf
Talal DeLorenzo, Shari 'ah Compliance Risk, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 397, 405-07 (2007).
12. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Jurisprudential Schizophrenia: On Form and Function in
Islamic Finance, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 605, 619-21 (2007).
13. Several prominent pan-Islamic organizations, such as the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, address contentious subjects in Islamic law through treatises and collective rulings. While
their opinions are widely respected, they are also rare and not necessarily authoritative. See MOHAMMAD
HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI'AH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 255-57 (2008).
14. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 1, at 34-41.
15. See id. at 36-38 (describing concerns over patching, or talfiq).
16. See KAMALI, supra note 13, at 162-66. But see Robert R. Bianchi, The Revolution in
Islamic Finance, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 569, 577-80 (2007) (describing how the "democratization of religious
thought" happens as lay Muslim consumers' purchasing power gives their perspectives greater
significance).
17. See DeLorenzo, supra note 11, at 397.
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accept the board's position, most try to include scholars with widely
recognized religious qualifications from a diverse array of jurisprudential
perspectives. 18 That said, the rapid growth of the Islamic finance industry has
created a shortage of qualified Islamic scholars in recent years, stretching
scholars' availability and forcing some institutions to rely increasingly upon
lay experts.
19
While shari'ah supervisory boards have become prevalent, the fact that
they are paid and maintained by the same institutions that they supervise
raises concerns regarding their independence and reliability. Consequently,
some groups have also worked to establish standards that can be applied as a
neutral benchmark across institutions. The Bahrain-based AAOIFI is the
oldest and most prominent of these organizations, as it has spent nearly two
decades developing the industry's most widely accepted standards on shari 'ah
compliance and other topics. Another prominent organization is the Islamic
Finance Services Board (IFSB) in Malaysia, which generates similar standards
with a special emphasis on the complex banking, capital markets, and
insurance sectors. Both groups incorporate Islamic scholars, industry
members, and regulators into the standards-generating process through
various conferences and working groups. 20 While some nations have
mandated the implementation of these or similar standards, they remain
largely voluntary. 21 That said, market pressures have promoted their
widespread implementation.
22
But in spite of these efforts, this system sometimes still yields different
perspectives on particular products, particularly along regional lines. 23 Most
notably, scholars in the Persian Gulf have repeatedly criticized their Southeast
Asian counterparts for approving certain controversial but market-friendly
products. Despite this disapproval, Muslim consumers in Southeast Asia have
generally followed the opinions of their local experts and continued to treat
these instruments as legitimate. 24 While not widely disruptive, this
disagreement underscores the uncertainty surrounding shari'ah compliance
and helps explain why some argue that even stronger standards are needed.
18. See id. at 399-402.
19. See Alexia Garamfalvi, Islamic Scholars Play Role in High Finance, LEGAL TIMES
(Wash., D.C.), Apr. 30, 2007, at 13.
20. See Who Regulates the Islamic Finance Sector?, REUTERS, Apr. 13, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idlNKLR44252720090413. For additional information on the history of
the AAOIFI and IFSB, their recent activities, and examples of their standards, visit their websites.
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, http://www.aaoifi.com (last
visited Nov. 28, 2009); Islamic Financial Services Board, http://www.ifsb.org (last visited Nov. 28,
2009).
21. See Tarek S. Zaher & M. Kabir Hassan, A Comparative Literature Survey of Islamic
Finance and Banking, FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Nov. 2001, at 155, 185-187
(surveying regulatory approaches to Islamic finance).
22. See DeLorenzo, supra note I1, at 401.
23. See Bianchi, supra note 16, at 575-76.
24. See EL-GAMAL, supra note 4, at 86-89 (describing the two regions' different approaches
to salam, or futures). But see Liau Y-Sing & Tom Freke, As Scholars Quibble, Sharia Banks Eye
Convergence, REUTERS, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE53GI4X20090417




IV. THE AAOIFI's PROPOSED NEW REGULATORY ROLE
The AAOIFI's aspiration to "homogenise the market" through its new
regulatory authority reflects these calls for more unified shari'ah compliance
standards. 25 As Secretary-General Mohamed Alchaar described in August
2009, the AAOIFI intends to review "products and services offered by the
industry for [shari'ah] compliance" to help fill the "huge gap in the market
relating to credible compliance screening." Alchaar describes this new role,
which is pending approval by the AAOIFI's Board of Trustees, as a temporary
one that will cease when permanent screening mechanisms are developed.
That said, the AAOIFI has said that it will conduct its screening "market-
wide, regardless of the geographic distribution of products," 27 implying that it
will review even those products whose issuers have chosen not to implement
the AAOIFI's ostensibly voluntary standards. And while Alchaar emphasized
that the AAOIFI would first work with institutions to address shari'ah
compliance concerns, he made clear that it would go public with its concerns
if necessary.28 Though Alchaar does not say so explicitly, this threat of public
censure and its market consequences appears to be the stick with which the
AAOIFI will enforce its determinations.
This interpretation is informed by the AAOIFI's actions during a recent
controversy surrounding the shari'ah compliance of certain types of sukuk. In
an influential 2007 paper, the Chairman of the AAOIFI's Shari'ah Board,
Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani, argued that sukuk that guaranteed
purchasers interest-free loans and repurchase agreements in cases of missed
payments or default were not shari'ah-compliant, as they effectively tied an
investor's returns to the creditworthiness of the issuer instead of the value of
the underlying assets in violation of gharar restrictions. 29 Later that year,
Usmani made public statements that as much as eighty-five percent of the
world's sukuk could be shari'ah-noncompliant due to these and other
measures, triggering an intense controversy. 30 After several months of debate,
the AAOIFI confirmed much of Usmani's analysis and issued new sukuk
guidelines prohibiting these practices. 31 Tellingly, these guidelines also
admonished the shari 'ah supervisory boards that had permitted such activities,
reasserting their duty to "make sure that the operation complies, at every
25. AAOIFI To Monitor Shariah Products, REUTERS, Oct. 10, 2009, http://www.business24
-7.ae/Articles/2009/8/Pages/09082009/08102009_af046dl da5cd49bb9dOcab506b826ef4.aspx (quoting a
statement by Mohamed Nedal Alchaar, Secretary-General of the AAOIFI).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Islamic Finance Growth Seen 10-20 Pct in 3yrs-Study, REUTERS, Oct. 15, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLF70613620091015.
29. See Muhammad Taqi Usmani, Sukuk and Their Contemporary Applications 7-13 (2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.failaka.com/downloads/Usmani-Sukuk
Applications.pdf; see also Farmida Bi, AAOIFI Statement on Sukuk and Its Implications (Sept. 2008),
http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/2008/pub l6852.aspx.
30. See Islamic Bond Rules May Be Reviewed, GULF DAILY NEWS (Bahr.), Nov. 22, 2007,
http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=200624.
31. See Accounting & Auditing Org. for Islamic Fin. Inst. (AAOIFI), Clarification of the
AAOIFI Standards Concerning Sukuk (Feb. 2008), http://www.aaoifi.com/aaoifisb_sukukFeb2008_
Eng.pdf.
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stage, with [shari'ah] guidelines and requirements." 32 As Alchaar later
described, these actions effectively "wrecked the market ' 33 for sukuk, leading
to a decrease in overall issuances and a dramatic shift toward less
controversial ijara-based sukuk structures. As institutions feared that
consumers would react negatively to the AAOIFI's public censure, they
rallied market forces that effectively curbed the offending practices and
triggered a more widespread reevaluation of sukuk standards by issuers.
34
Meanwhile, as the Islamic finance industry struggled through the
ensuing global financial crisis, many more voices joined the call for more
effective shari'ah compliance, arguing that close imitation of conventional
finance had exposed the industry to unnecessary and unethical risks. 35 For
individuals interested in advancing such a system, the AAOIFI-respected for
its widely accepted standards and now demonstrably able to enforce its stance
through market forces-no doubt seemed increasingly well-suited to do so.
Hence, this growing consensus around the need for better regulation and
recognition of means by which it could be achieved together seem to be likely
motivators for the AAOIFI's most recent actions.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ISLAMIC FINANCE INDUSTRY
Thus far, responses to the AAOIFI's proposal have been reservedly
optimistic. Some industry leaders have welcomed its proposal as a "very good
move" toward more uniform shari'ah compliance standards.36 Most agree that
shared international standards will reduce the shari'ah compliance risk facing
many products and create larger and more efficient consumer markets by
allowing institutions more easily to market their products in different
countries and regions. That said, others have expressed some reservations.
While the AAOIFI's existing standards are widely accepted, this is in part
because they leave significant space for interpretation and innovation in
application. Reviewing actual applications of these standards will require the
AAOIFI to take a stronger stand on certain interpretive disputes, foreclosing
opportunities for innovation and triggering new resistance.
37
Yet there are signs that some influential figures within the AAOIFI feel
that such a strong stand is necessary. Most notable among them is Sheikh
Usmani. In his 2007 paper on sukuk, Usmani noted that Islamic scholars'
32. Id. at 4.
33. Jason Benham, Islamic Bond Market 'Wrecked' by Critical Remarks,
ARABIANBUSINESS.COM, Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/536401-islamic-bond-market
-wrecked-by-critical-remarks (quoting a statement by Mohamed Nedal Alchaar, Secretary-General of
the AAOIFI).
34. See Daliah Merzaban, Scholar Critique Spurs Ijara Islamic Bond, REUTERS, Apr. 15,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE53COZX20090415.
35. See, e.g., Lahem al Nasser, Imitating Traditional Banking Will Destroy Islamic Banking,
ASHARQ ALAWSAT (London), Nov. 28, 2009, http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=6&id=18957.
36. Lack of Sharia Standard Limiting Islamic Funds-BNP, FORBES.COM, Sept. 13, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afd2009/09/13/afx6879191.html (quoting a statement by Jacques Tripon,
Global Head of Islamic Banking, BNP Paribas).
37. For a survey of industry perspectives on convergence, see Karen Remo-Listana, Islamic
Finance Standardisation Needs To Be Tackled Carefully, EMIRATES BUSINESS 24/7, Oct. 25, 2009,
http://www.business24-7.ae (search for "Islamic finance standardisation").
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leniency on many matters of shari'ah compliance had been intended to permit
the industry to innovate and grow in its difficult early years, when it had to
compete directly with conventional finance. But now that the industry has
come into its own, Usmani argues, Islamic institutions should "cooperate
among themselves for the purpose of developing authentic products that...
serve the higher purposes of Islamic law" more than economic interests.
38
Usmani saw his position on sukuk as a reflection of this need to push the
industry toward higher standards, a need that has been echoed in postfinancial
crisis rhetoric.
39
The AAOIFI's new regulatory authority could be a potent tool for those
wishing to push Islamic finance out of its infancy and toward more rigorous
standards. But employing it too aggressively will deter innovation and thus
make Islamic financial products increasingly inefficient compared to
conventional products. As this efficiency gap increases, marginal Muslim
consumers willing to purchase conventional ones if they offer significantly
better terms may effectively get priced out of the Islamic market. Not only
would this weaken the impact of the AAOIFI's censure, but some institutions
might also find it more profitable to buck the AAOIFI and adopt less
demanding standards that capture these marginal consumers. Ironically, this
could result in the very outcome that the AAOIFI is intended to counteract:
fragmentation along interpretive and regional lines.
40
VI. CONCLUSION
By strategically applying its new regulatory authority, the AAOIFI can
encourage continued convergence, gradually advance more demanding
shari'ah compliance standards, and eliminate particularly problematic
industry practices. But using the threat of public censure to impose new
standards too aggressively could injure innovation and efficiency, and create
new fault lines within Islamic financial markets. Consequently, the new
regulators at the AAOIFI must be careful in approaching their new
responsibilities, and do so with the respect for gradualness and consensus-
building to which the industry owes much of its success thus far.
38. Usmani, supra note 29, at 14. The AAOIFI's official sukuk standards similarly encourage
Islamic financial institutions "to increase true partnerships based on profit and loss sharing in order to
achieve the objectives of the Shari'ah." AAOIFI, supra note 30, at 4.
39. See, e.g., al Nasser, supra note 35.
40. See Bianchi, supra note 16, at 575-76.
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A Supreme Court, Supreme Parliament, and Transnational National
Rights. By Alyssa King
In October 2009, the former Law Lords became justices of the newly
created Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. With new jurisdiction, and
with its own building and resources, the Supreme Court is separate from
Parliament for the first time.1 The new Court can be seen as a procedural
complement to the substantive reform made by the United Kingdom's Human
2Rights Act (HRA). Parliament's decision to create the Court, like its choice
to codify human rights law, was made partly in response to the influence of
the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) and supranational institutions
on the state. Some politicians hoped that a supreme court would be able to
articulate a distinct national vision in response to the imposition of
supranational instruments.
If this reaction were confined to the United Kingdom, it might be a
particularity of that state's relationship with continental Europe, but similar
courses of action have come to pass in other states with traditions of
parliamentary sovereignty. In 2003, reforms in Belgium gave the
Constitutional Court the power to review rights under the national
constitution. 3 The French Parliament is finalizing a grant of concrete
jurisdiction over rights cases to the Constitutional Council which previously
was limited to abstract questions of constitutionality raised by Parliament.4 In
each of these instances, parliamentary discussions have highlighted the
perceived need to create a system of constitutional review that will have
priority over review under the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR).5
In many European states, judges in supreme courts have been viewed as
potential buffers between the national legislature and the ECtHR, creating a
coherent explanation of the legal order and giving transnational rights local
meaning. 6 Speaking of fundamental rights and values, these judges explain the
meaning of the law by choosing among competing narratives, or by writing
their own.7 In some respects, the recent reforms to the European judiciaries
have only reinforced the judicial role as it has traditionally operated under
systems of parliamentary sovereignty; they further empower judges to allow
them to speak for the constitution on the belief that judges are the "mouth...
I. Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, §§ 40, 48-50 (Eng.).
2. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
3. Erika de Wet, The Reception Process in the Netherlands and Belgium, in A EUROPE OF
RIGHTS 229, 250 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008).
4. Bill No. 1975 of Oct. 14, 2009, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/
13/pdf/projets/pl I 975.pdf (Fr.).
5. See, e.g., Verbatim Report from the Session of July 21, 2008, Journal Officiel de la
R~publique Franqaise: Dbats Parlementaires [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France: Parliamentary Debates],
July 22, 2008, at 15-16 (Fr.), available at http://www.assembleenationale.net/I3/pdf/cri/2007-2008
-extra/20081990.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Aidan O'Neill, Judging Democracy: the Devolutionary Settlement and the
Scottish Constitution, in BUILDING THE UK's NEW SUPREME COURT 23, 36-37 (Anthony Le Sueur ed.,
2004) (arguing that the German constitutional courts play a protective role as a final arbiter on
fundamental rights and that British courts may too).
7. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 9-10 (1983).
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of the law." 8 Entry into the supranational European legal order brought a
second layer of judicial review, but not necessarily a new view of judges.
Judges in national high courts are assumed to express the national law in their
decisions, as opposed to ECtHR judges who employ transnational legal norms
in their work.
The idea that the judge gives voice to a component of national identity is
readily apparent in discussions of the HRA. The United Kingdom began
allowing individual petitions to the ECtHR in 1966, as attempts to create a bill
of rights gained traction. 9 The incorporation of the ECHR into national law
provided an expedient way to write a human rights bill, as was done in 1998
with the HRA. Supporters walked a thin line between engaging Europe and
maintaining that the rights they sought to codify were not foreign. In this vein,
the United Kingdom's involvement in drafting the ECHR was frequently cited
in political debate.' 1 The title of the government's white paper on the HRA
bill, Rights Brought Home, evokes the idea that the rights in the ECHR are
properly British rights, and that they ought to be dealt with "at home." The
number of U.K. cases sent to the ECtHR remained a political preoccupation.'
2
Some politicians saw the work of the ECtHR as revoking control over the
development and direction of U.K. law from the United Kingdom.
Though they wished to decrease the number of cases in the ECtHR and
keep cases in the U.K. courts, parliamentarians understood that incorporating
the ECHR would not remove the possibility that some cases would reach the
supranational court. Still, supporters of the bill emphasized the importance of
the domestic judicial voice. As the government put it: "British judges will be
enabled to make a distinctively British contribution to the development of the
jurisprudence of human rights in Europe."' 3 The influence of British judges
was a remedy not only for the volume of cases the United Kingdom had to
defend in the ECtHR, but also for perceived misunderstandings of and lack of
appreciation for the state's legal tradition.' 4 Concerns about preservation of
U.K. law were transformed into concerns about giving U.K. judges tools with
which to express the law of the sovereign vis-a-vis European judges.
The creation of the Supreme Court in the 2005 Constitutional Reform
Act (CRA) continued this theme with implications for the distribution of
judicial power in two respects. First, the CRA unifies final jurisdiction over
rights cases. Second, the removal of the Law Lords from Parliament
8. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 163 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller &
Harold S. Stone eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1748) (describing the U.K. constitution
and referring to judges as the "mouth that pronounces the words of the law").
9. ROBERT BLACKBURN, TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE UNITED
KINGDOM 5-6 (1999).
10. Id. at 7.
11. See, e.g., 582 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 1227f, reprinted in BLACKBURN, supra
note 9, at 377; HOME DEP'T, RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL, 1997, Cm. 3782,
1. 14, available at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/hoffice/rights/contents.htm.
12. Compare Human Rights Sub-Comm., Nat'l Executive Comm., A Charter of Human
Rights: A Discussion Document for the Labour Movement (1976), reprinted in BLACKBURN, supra note
9, at 917, 92 1, with HOME DEP'T, supra note 1I, 1.16.
13. HOME DEP'T, supra note 12, 1.14.
14. See, e.g., MARY BARBER, HOME AFFAIRS SECTION, THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL, 1997-8,
H.C. 98/24, at 14; see also 582 PARL. DEB., H.L. at 1227f.
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underlines the independence of the judiciary. 15 The strategy is to accept
European norms in order to more effectively resist them, but the logic behind
this strategy relies on a misperception about the ability to draw distinctions
between judges and the law. Judges may be important, but only because they
are assumed to defend and explain state law, not change it.
The HRA serves as a basis for invalidating judicial and administrative
decisions. 6 For statutes, the Court exercises what Mark Tushnet calls "weak-
form judicial review." 17 Justices are to interpret laws in a way that renders
them compatible with the HRA where possible. If the Court deems it
appropriate, it may issue a declaration of incompatibility. This declaration sets
in motion a process to change the law, through ordinary legislation, fast track
legislation or, in urgent cases, a ministerial order that then must be ratified by
Parliament.'
8
Unified jurisdiction was needed after Scottish devolution created
opportunities for disagreement between the Lords' and Privy Councils. 19
Under devolution, Parliament has granted limited legislative powers to
regional legislatures. Until the creation of the new Supreme Court, the Privy
Council reviewed the limits on the powers of these devolved parliaments.
The Scottish Parliament may not make laws contrary to the ECHR. Litigation
in the Privy Council became a particularly important avenue for ECHR claims
regarding Scottish criminal law, which the Law Lords had no power to
review. 2Meanwhile, the Law Lords (who also made up part of the judicial
committee of the Privy Council) used the HRA to review acts of Parliament
and other laws made by the devolved legislatures. Because devolution
decisions are binding on all British judges, the small space in which the Privy
Council has dominated, Scottish criminal law, had an outsized effect on the
rest of the United Kingdom. 22 This arrangement thus would have given
Scottish law disproportionate influence in the legal system. Limiting the effect
of Scottish criminal cases to Scotland or refusing to recognize parallel
jurisprudence between the ECHR and the HRA were not satisfactory solutions
because either option would leave a disjointedness akin to a circuit split in the
U.S. federal courts that the ECtHR would have to resolve. Such an
arrangement would further conflict with a unified vision of the rule of law in
the United Kingdom.
Another justification for creating a Supreme Court in the United
Kingdom was the enhanced visibility of separation of powers.23 This cosmetic
change has both internal and external audiences. The government had hoped
15. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: A SUPREME COURT FOR
THE UNITED KINGDOM 157 (2003), http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/supremecourt/supreme.pdf.
16. COLIN TURPIN & BETH TOMPKINS, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 272
(6th ed. 2007).
17. MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS 28 (2008).
18. Id.
19. O'Neill, supra note 6, at 42.
20. Anthony Bradley, The Sovereignty of Parliament-Form or Substance?, in THE CHANGING
CONSTITUTION 25, 50 (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 6th ed. 2007).
21. O'Neill, supra note 6, at 31.
22. Id. at 33.
23. 429 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 564 (statement of Christopher Leslie) (claiming the
Court will "create a visible apex of an independent United Kingdom judicial system").
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that the internal audience, U.K. residents, would become more aware of the
role of law in their lives, 4 further emphasizing its aim of building a sense of
national identity through legal identity.25 Externally, the change was thought
to alleviate tension between the domestic judiciary and the ECtHR, which has
been seen as increasingly assertive in its criticism of domestic judiciaries.
One general goal of the CRA was to increase judicial independence. 6
Independence is of greater importance when judges have greater powers to
censure the legislature and when it is important that people recognize that they
can enforce their rights in national courts. Like the HRA, the Court was
presented as a "modernizing" move, bringing the United Kingdom in line with
the rest of Europe. 27 Lord Thomas Bingham, an early campaigner for the
Supreme Court, declared the need to respond to global changes and clarify the
functional separation of powers "a cardinal aspect of a modern liberal
democratic state governed by the rule of law."
28
As the U.K. government was aware, European decisions also raised the
possibility that the Law Lords' place in the legislature would be incompatible
with ECHR guarantees of an impartial judiciary. 29 The 2000 ECtHR decision
of McGonnell v. United Kingdom censured a local official who presided over
deliberations on a development plan and then sat as judge in a case
challenging the plan several years later.30 It prompted the Law Lords to adopt
a statement saying they would no longer take part in politically sensitive
debates. 31 The analogy is imperfect, as the House of Lords can delay but
cannot create law. Yet, given their increased ability to rule on rights and their
place as expositors of U.K. law, the Lords may have wished to avoid any risk
that the ECtHR would threaten their position and legitimacy. By making a
concession on structure, U.K. politicians avoid concessions on the content of
U.K. laws.
The new U.K. Supreme Court reflects a reaction to the growing
importance of European law in the legal systems of member states. This
reaction, which ties national law to national identity, also assumes domestic
judges will be defenders of that law. This attitude, apparent in the HRA, is
also evident in the creation of the Court, which unifies jurisdiction on rights
issues and raises the profile of the domestic judges. Still, these reforms depend
not only on the identification of law with identity, but also on that of the judge
with the law. In one sense, the HRA may have brought rights home; the
number of British petitions to the ECtHR has been reduced in recent years.
32
However, the government's incentives to heed declarations of incompatibility
24. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 15, at 11.
25. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: DEVELOPING OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, 2009, Cm. 7577.
26. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 15, at 11, 13.
27. Michael Skold, The Reform Act's Supreme Court: A Missed Opportunity for Judicial
Review in the United Kingdom?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 2149, 2157 (2007).
28. Anthony Lester, The Human Rights Act 1998-Five Years On, 2004 EUR. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 258.
29. 657 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 1226.
30. App. No. 28488/95, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 289, 291 (2000).
31. TURPIN & TOMPKINS, supra note 16, at 125.
32. Robert Verkaik, Lawsuits on Human Rights Halve Despite European Act, INDEPENDENT
(U.K.), Apr. 20, 2009, at 16.
Recent Developments
are directly linked to the threat of loss in the ECtHR if it does not amend its
laws. 33 As a result, the goal of a reduction in petitions will clash with the
Supreme Court's institutional interests because it deprives the Court of a
meaningful enforcement mechanism against Parliament. As the Court
responds to changes to the status of national law wrought by European
integration, not to mention internal rights debates such as those over privacy
and terrorism, Parliament may question the representativeness of these judges.
Its authority will likely be built on a more complicated picture of how judges
interact with litigants and law and to what extent judges can be said to speak
for law.
33. TUSHNET, supra note 17, at 30.
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North Korea and the Politics of International Trade Law: the Kaesong
Industrial Complex and WTO Rules of Origin. By Daniel J. Knudsen &
William J. Moont
The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), a new joint economic venture
between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the
Republic of Korea (South Korea), is becoming a nexus of controversial issues
in international trade law. The manufacturing centers at Kaesong, located in
North Korea, use North Korean labor and South Korean capital to produce
labor-intensive products like clothes, shoes and watches.' These goods are
2then shipped to South Korea and either consumed there or exported.
The export of KIC goods could be problematic under the World Trade
Organization's (WTO) Rules of Origin and rules on preferential treatment.
North Korea is not a member of the WTO, and its human rights record and
isolationism make it a highly polarizing state. 3 States that have allowed KIC
goods to be treated as goods produced in South Korea are pursuing a policy
that may violate WTO regulations. Through South Korea's membership in the
WTO and South Korean Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), the goods produced
in the KIC bypass many of the trade sanctions placed upon North Korean
goods.
With the resumption of daily cross-border traffic into the KIC this
summer, the resurgence of economic cooperation between North and South
Korea brings these trade issues into international focus once again.4 There are
also important issues for the U.S. government to consider, in light of the U.S.-
Korea Free Trade Agreement, signed but not yet in force. While the issue of
the KIC has received some attention in the literature, scholars have yet to
scrutinize WTO law and the other legal issues that surround the topic. This
piece presents an overview of the KIC and the legal issues it raises, provides
preliminary analysis of these issues, and raises awareness of the important
policy implications that the U.S. government should consider.
The development of the KIC dates to 1989, when Hyundai Asan, one of
the largest conglomerates in South Korea, first engaged with North Korean
leadership to develop a special economic zone in North Korea. In 2000,
Hyundai Asan offered US$500 million to Pyongyang in return for exclusive
t The authors would like to thank Professor Lea Brilmayer of Yale Law School, Research
Professor Lim Eul-chul of Kyungnam University in South Korea, and the editorial staff of the Yale
Journal of International Law.
1. Moon lhlwan, North Korea's Kaesong Clamor, Bus. WK., June 11, 2009, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jun2009/gb2009061_786969.htm.
2. Ho Cheol Kim, Does Annex 22-B of the Proposed United States-Korea Free Trade
Agreement Contemplate and Allow for Trade with Respect to North Korea?, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 67, 71-
73 (2008).
3. See generally James T. Laney & Jason T. Shaplen, How To Deal with North Korea,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 16 (2003) (discussing rising tensions in the Korean peninsula);
Stephan Haggard & Marcus Noland, North Korea in 2008: Twilight of the God?, 49 ASIAN SURVEY 98
(2009), available at http://caliber.ucpress.net/doi/pdf/10.1525/as.2009.49.1.98 (discussing recent
developments in North Korean international relations).
4. Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Opens Border, Again Calls for U.S. Treaty, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2009, at A8; Evan Ramstad & Sungha Park, Pyongyang Raises Ire on Industrial Complex,
WALL ST. J., June 12, 2009 (describing how production at the KIC has frequently been interrupted by
changing political circumstances in the region).
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business rights over the development of sixty-six million square meters in
Kaesong. 5 Despite political setbacks between the two countries, 6 North Korea
eventually passed the Kaesong Industrial Zone Law on November 20, 2002.
On December 23, 2002, North Korea granted Hyundai a Land Use Permit and
on June 30, 2003 groundbreaking ceremonies took place . Production of
goods started in 2004, and has progressed unevenly since then.
8
From a business perspective, the KIC has several attractive features.
First, North Korean authorities established the minimum wage at US$68.10
per month in 2007, 9 which is "lower than the average wage of workers at
Qingdao, China, which is approximately US$100 [per month], and is only
43% of the wages of Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (US$134 per month)."' 1
Secondly, the corporate income tax rate of 10-14% is better than South
Korea's 13-25%, China's 15%, and Vietnam's 10-15%." These features have
led to a proliferation of trade between North Korea and South Korea since the
opening of the KIC: in 2008, the total commercial exchange reached US$1.82
billion, accounting for 45% of North Korea's total trade. 12 As of February
2009, 101 South Korean companies employ about thirty-nine thousand North
Koreans in the complex. '3 The explosive growth of the KIC is only the
beginning, as estimates from the South Korean government suggest that when
the complex is fully operational sixteen hundred businesses, employing
ninety-nine thousand workers, will account for US$17.1 billion in annual
output. 14
Despite these ambitious plans and the resumption of manufacturing in
the KIC, there has been little transnational legal scrutiny of the treatment of
goods manufactured at the KIC with regards to rules of origin.
Controversially, the policy of treating the goods as South Korean in origin
would de facto grant some goods produced in North Korea the treatment
accorded to those from a state with most-favored-nation (MFN) status under
the WTO,' 5 and these goods would benefit even further from some of South
Korea's FTAs. In this section, we discuss the WTO Rules of Origin and
highlight one WTO panel decision that may be instructive in predicting the
outcome of legal challenges relating to the production of goods at the KIC.
5. LIM EUL-CHUL, KAESONG INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HISTORY, PENDING ISSUES, AND
OUTLOOK 15-17 (2007).
6. Joongi Kim, The Challenges of Attracting Foreign Investment into North Korea: The
Legal Regimes of Sinuiju and Gaeseong, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1306, 1309 (2004) (discussing the
impact of the war against terror, a skirmish in the Yellow Sea between North Korean and South Korean
naval forces, and Hyundai Asan's financial troubles).
7. Id. at 1309-10.
8. See, e.g., Choe Sang-Hun, Joint Project Puts 2 Koreas at Odds Again, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 2009, at A7.
9. EUL-CHUL, supra note 5, at 147.
10. Id. at 72.
II. Id. at 73. In addition, South Korean companies conducting business in North Korea are not
required to pay taxes in South Korea. See id.
12. U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: South Korea (Oct. 2009), http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/ei/bgnI2800.htm.
13. Id.
14. EUL-CHUL, supra note 5, at 60.
15. The most-favored-nation principle of the WTO articulates that importing nations may not
treat member states differently when granting trade advantages (for example, tariffs or quotas).
Recent Developments
Since there is no doctrine of stare decisis in WTO dispute settlements, our
analysis is necessarily rooted in the context of the political economy of
international trade.
In response to concerns about rules of origin as barriers to trade, the
WTO passed the 1994 Agreement on Rules of Origin, 6 attempting to
harmonize disparate sets of rules. 17 The Agreement sets out two types of rules
of origin: preferential rules of origin and nonpreferential rules of origin.
Preferential rules of origin are rules tied to side agreements between two or
more states and are different from nonpreferential rules in that
"[nonpreferential rules of origin] are not related to contractual or autonomous
trade regimes leading to the granting of tariff preferences going beyond the
application of paragraph 1 of Article I of GATT 1994."' 8 The WTO Rules of
Origin do not apply to preferential trading arrangements between two or more
countries, such as the "Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), free trade
areas, [and] bilateral and regional integration agreements."'19 Rules not falling
under these exceptions are treated as nonpreferential, bound by the WTO
Rules of Origin.
Export of KIC goods involves both types of rules of origin. For
countries that have bilateral trade agreements with 'South Korea, the specific
FTAs will govern the origin status of KIC goods. South Korea has
aggressively negotiated with its trading partners to treat goods from the KIC
as South Korean goods, using special rules in their FTAs to determine origin
status. This resulted in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
acknowledging KIC products as "Made in Korea," and the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) and Singapore have also granted tariff preferences
for KIC-manufactured goods, treating them as South Korean goods.2 ° South
Korea's FTA with Singapore uses an Integrated Sourcing Initiatives rule in
which "the sole requirement [for origin] ... is that goods must be directly
exported from the territory of South Korea, irrespective of the origin status of
the goods."'2 1 The FTAs with EFTA and ASEAN use an Outward Processing
22
approach. These are both methods of avoiding a North Korean designation
for Kaesong goods.
For countries that have not entered into FTAs with South Korea, KIC
goods follow the nonpreferential rules of origin. China, for example,
announced that goods produced in the KIC would be treated as South Korean
goods. 23 Since China has not entered into an FTA with South Korea,
nonpreferential rules of origin apply. But origin determinations under these
rules are ambiguous; the WTO's determinations have been subject to various
16. Agreement on Rules of Origin, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 397.
17. John Coyle, Essay, Rules of Origin as Instruments of Foreign Economic Policy: An
Analysis of the Integrated Sourcing Initiative in the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, 29 YALE J.
INT'L L. 545, 550 (2004).
18. Agreement on Rules of Origin, supra note 16, art. 1.
19. INT'L TRADE CTR., RULES OF ORIGIN IN EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE 1 (2000).
20. EUL-CHUL, supra note 5, at 189.
21. Kim, supra note 2, at 78.
22. Id.
23. China To Recognize Kaesong Goods as Made in S. Korea, CHOSUN ILBO (Seoul, S.
Korea), July 3, 2006, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/htm1_dir/2006/07/03/2006070361043.html.
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criticisms for their subjectivity and inconsistent outcomes. 24 According to
Article II of the Agreement on Rules of Origin, a product is conferred the
status of origin where "wholly obtained" or, if multinationally produced, "the
country where the last substantial -transformation has been carried out."' 25 The
WTO has not clearly defined "substantial transformation." In fact, according
to a panel report interpreting Article II of the Agreement on Rules of Origin,
members are granted "considerable discretion in designing and applying their
rules of origin" until the harmonization of the rules is completed.
2F
It seems that it will be difficult for KIC products to qualify as South
Korean goods under Article II of the Rules of Origin.2 7 First, KIC goods, by
definition, cannot possibly be "wholly obtained" in South Korea. Second, they
are unlikely to meet the standards of the proposed ways of ascertaining
"substantial transformation." The general principle largely accepted is to grant
origin status to the place where the "last substantial process" took place.
28
Three alternative methods further define substantial transformation: a
"domestic content test," which enumerates the degree of transformation
necessary to confer origin to the good; a "technical test," which confers origin
to the product if the product undergoes a specific processing procedure; and
the "change in tariff classification" method, which determines rules of origin
based on changes in tariff classification.29 While the majority of the products
from the KIC are shipped to South Korea before being exported, no material
transformation goes into the goods after they are produced in the KIC. Despite
the large degree of discretion granted by the rules of origin in the transitional
period, granting origin status to a country that simply served as an
intermediary merchant seems to defy any common understanding of
"substantial transformation."
On the other hand, arguments can be made for conferring South Korean
origin status on goods produced in the KIC due to the unique nature of the
special economic zone. First, South Korea plays a large role in supplying the
inputs used in production. The South Korean government, for example, chose
Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) as the electricity provider for the
KIC. KEPCO provides to the KIC fifteen thousand kilowatts per hour of
South Korean electricity. 30 More importantly, KIC companies bring all
resources-sand, gravel, and agricultural goods-from South Korea, as North
Korea is not providing any raw materials.31 All these factors could allow some
KIC goods to fail the WTO rules, depending on how much transformation
actually occurs in North Korea.
24. See N. David Palmeter, The U.S. Rules of Origin Proposal to GA TT: Monotheism or
Polytheism?, J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1990, at 36.
25. Agreement on Rules of Origin, supra note 16.
26. Panel Report, United States-Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel Products,
WT/DS243/R (June 20, 2003) [hereinafter WTO Panel Report].
27. This would mean that the Chinese policy of treating KIC goods as South Korean goods
could be in violation of WTO rules.
28. Moshe Hirsche, Asymmetric Incidence of Rules of Origin, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1998, at
44.
29. Id.
30. EUL-CHUL, supra note 5, at 202.
31. Id. at 194.
Recent Developments
While the origin of KIC products is theoretically debatable, due
consideration should be given to whether a WTO challenge will ever take
place. Three factors suggest that the KIC origin policies are unlikely to be
challenged in the foreseeable future. First, since broad authority is given to the
importing country in interpreting the Rules of Origin,32 WTO members will be
wary of litigating an issue that is unlikely to win. Second, even if granting
South Korean origin to KIC goods is legally questionable, it conforms to the
general WTO principle of reducing trade barriers. Third, countries importing
KIC-produced goods will economically benefit from the cheap North Korean
labor supply. In calculating the realistic possibility of a WTO challenge, these
factors should be weighed against the tendency for governments to use Rules
of Origin as a tool for protectionism and against the deep political concerns
that many countries have relating to both human rights violations and the
nuclear program in North Korea.
33
The KIC presents large policy implications for the United States. The
development of the KIC has allowed goods produced by North Korean labor
unprecedented access to international markets, allowing the regime to secure
much-needed foreign currency. This could weaken U.S. leverage in
negotiations with North Korea, since the United States has relied heavily on
trade sanctions.
34
The U.S.-South Korea FTA (KORUS FTA), signed in 2007 and
awaiting legislative approval in both countries, complicates the issue further.
Should the United States approve the KORUS FTA, the WTO preferential
rules of origin would govern, displacing default nonpreferential rules of
origin. Currently, the language of the KORUS FTA denies goods produced in
the KIC duty free status, although the two states have set up a committee that
will consider whether KIC goods will be deemed goods originating in South
Korea. 35 Special rules used in past U.S. FTAs, including Integrated Sourcing
Initiatives, Outward Processing, and Qualifying Industrial Zone regimes,
could influence the committee in its KIC deliberations. 36 Since trade sanctions
have been the primary tool for U.S. leverage over North Korea, this
committee could serve as an important instrument for inducing political
change in North Korea.
The U.S. government needs to weigh multiple issues in considering
whether to treat KIC goods as South Korean goods. On the one hand, the rise
of the KIC will increase North Korea's access to foreign funds, which could
be used to continue its nuclear program and fuel the authoritarian regime. On
the other hand, improvement in North Korea's foreign funds supply could
reduce the tendency of North Korea to sell weapons to international terrorist
32. WTO Panel Report, supra note 26.
33. See MICHAEL E. O'HANLON & MIKE MOCHIZUKI, CRISIS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA:
How To DEAL WITH A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA 2 (2003) (proposing an agenda that will address the
"acute nuclear weapon crisis" and "human rights issues").
34. See Franklin L. Lavin, Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Fall 1996, at 138, 151 (discussing various ways in which the United States could impose or lift sanctions
to induce certain behavior by the North Korean government).
35. Suk Hi Kim, The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of April 1, 2007, and Kaseong
Industrial Complex, 3 N. KOREAN REV. 119, 126 (2007).
36. See Kim, supra note 2, at 75.
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organizations for fast foreign currency. 37 As Michael E. O'Hanlon and Mike
Mochizuki have argued, such economic improvement would be an important
piece in discouraging the regime's "extortionist behavior." 38 Moreover,
increased access to foreign currency could be used to alleviate domestic food
shortage by facilitating the import of more food. The KIC could also serve as
an important starting point for North Korean economic integration that could
induce a political shift in the region.
The KIC represents a new avenue for the international community to
deal with North Korea. WTO Rules of Origin play an extremely important
role here because if KIC goods are treated as South Korean goods, North
Korea is presented with the opportunity to bypass high tariff barriers that
previously made its products prohibitively expensive for international
consumers. The WTO Rules of Origin appear to permit a policy treating KIC
goods as South Korean goods for those states that have bilateral trade
agreements with South Korea (assuming that they include specific provisions
to that effect), but the issue remains complicated for states that do not have
such agreements with South Korea. This has large implications for the United
States, because acceleration of North Korea's access to international markets
could undermine U.S. leverage over the authoritarian regime. We argue that
the United States should be carefully attuned to the new challenges and
opportunities that the KIC presents in developing further policy decisions
toward North Korea and the pending KORUS FTA.
37. See O'HANLON & MOCHIZUKI, supra note 33, at 4 ("Pushing North Korea to the brink
may also increase the odds that it will sell plutonium to the highest bidder to rescue its economy."); see
also Daniel A. Pinkston & Phillip C. Saunders, Seeing North Korea Clearly, 45 SURVIVAL 79, 89 (2003)
(discussing President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address, in which the President suggested that
North Korea might provide terrorist groups with weapons of mass destruction).
38. See O'HANLON & MocHIzuKI, supra note 33, at 4.
The Rise (and Fall?) of Defamation of Religions. By Lorenz Langer
In the autumn of 2009, the controversy over the Muhammad cartoons
1
reached Yale University. The decision by Yale University Press to remove not
only the reproduction of the Danish drawings, but also any depiction of the
prophet from an upcoming book on the cartoons 2 drew angry comments from
several quarters. 3 Defenders of free speech clashed with those demanding
consideration for Muslim feelings, as well as those worried about a potentially
violent response to the cartoons.
4
This latest episode in the cartoon saga shows that the balance between
freedom of expression and the protection of religious sensitivities is still
elusive. Whether reprinted by the Press or not, the cartoons are now in the
public domain, where they will provide a ready means to cause offense for
decades to come. Adherents of a religion might be more hurt by insults to
their faith than by (penalized) libel of their own person. Yet making religions
(or their interpreters) the arbiter over what may be said would impose
considerable constraints on public discourse.
Discussion about the limits of speech can be framed in moral, religious,
legal, or political terms, or a combination thereof.5 When the Muslim world
took offence at Salman Rushdie's novel The Satanic Verses, the response was
almost exclusively religious, with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's fatwa as
the sad apogee. The Danish cartoons sparked violence, 7 but also court
proceedings in natiorqal, regional, and international fora. The reaction of
Muslim governments was couched in legal terms instead of religious
condemnation: from the outset, elites in Muslim states relied on international
law and human rights norms to denounce defamation of religions as a
violation of human dignity. 8 They also insisted that the international legal
framework addressing the balance between freedom of expression and
protection of religion was deficient, claiming that it did not sufficiently
I. The cartoons first appeared in Flemming Rose, Muhammeds Ansigt [The Face of
Muhammed], JYLLANDS-POSTEN, Sept. 30, 2005, at 3 (Den.).
2. JYTTE KLAUSEN, THE CARTOONS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD (2009).
3. Patricia Cohen, PEN Makes Appeal to Yale Press, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, at C2;
Mona Eltahawy, Yale's Misguided Retreat, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2009, at A 15.
4. See Marcia Inborn, A Major Form of Blasphemy, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Sept. 9, 2009,
available at http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/2009_1 l/yup-inhom057.html; John
Negroponte, A Risk of "Violence of an Unpredictable Nature," YALE ALUMNI MAG., Sept. 9, 2009,
http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/extras/yup/negroponte149.html; Michael Steinberg, Light and
Truth and a Free Press, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Sept. 9, 2009,' available at
http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/extras/yup/steinberg l49.html.
5. The lines between these different types of discussions can often be difficult to draw.
Swearing, for instance, is morally frowned upon, but can also lead to religious sanctions, see Exodus
20:7; Leviticus 20:9, 24:10-16, or legal sanctions, see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The
Sedition Act used legal means for political ends. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
6. For an overview, see THE RUSHDIE FILE (Lisa Appignanesi & Sara Maitland eds., 1990).
Legal proceedings under blasphemy laws did take place in the United Kingdom, see R v. Chief
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Choudhury, [1991] 1 Q.B. 429, with an unsuccessful
appeal to the European Commission of Human Rights, see Choudhury v. United Kingdom, App. No.
17439/90, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 172, 172-73 (1991).
7. For a detailed account, see KLAUSEN, supra note 2.
8. See Letter from Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, to the U.N.
Sec'y-Gen., U.N. Doc. A/60/566 (Nov. 23, 2005).
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safeguard religious feelings, that its implementation was ridden with double
standards, and that it therefore needed to be complemented with provisions
banning defamation of religions outright. This view is consistent with the
abortive attempts by Muslim associations to obtain a ruling on the cartoons in
an international forum; however, both the European Court of Human Rights
and the Committee on Human Rights dismissed the respective applications on
procedural grounds.9
This Recent Development retraces the demands for protecting religions
from offense and the attempts to initiate the drafting of new legal instruments
to ensure such protection. While several international human rights
conventions contain provisions that address freedom of religion, there is no
instrument that exclusively focuses on religion or its protection. Efforts to
draft a convention against religious intolerance date back to the 1960s, but
resulted only in the nonbinding 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.10
The Declaration was directed against discrimination of individuals by "any
State, institution, group of persons or person on the grounds of religion or
belief."" In contrast, the broader concept of "defamation of religions" raised
by the cartoons controversy encompasses the creed itself. This concept made
its first appearance before the cartoons, when Pakistan, on behalf of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), introduced a draft resolution
on combating "[d]efamation of Islam" in the U.N. Human Rights Commission
in 1999. 2 The resolution was to counter "new manifestations of intolerance
and misunderstanding, not to say hatred, of Islam and Muslims," and to
oppose portrayals of Islam as a religion hostile to human rights.1
3
Suggestions by some Commission members to broaden the scope to
other religions were first resisted by an insistence that "the problem faced by
Islam was of a very special nature." 14 After protracted haggling, however,
Pakistan introduced a revised draft resolution which encompassed religions in
general while still emphasizing the particularly vulnerable situation of Islam.
This second draft was adopted by the Commission without a vote. 15 The
resolution's operative part expressed concern about "negative stereotyping of
religions"' 6 and about "any role in which the print, audio-visual or electronic
media or any other means is used to incite acts of violence, xenophobia or
9. Human Rights Comm., Decision: Communication No. 1487/2006, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/92/D/1487/2006 (Apr. 18, 2008); Ben El Mahi v. Denmark, App. No. 5853/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr.
10. G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (Nov. 5, 1981).
11. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
12. Comm'n on Human Rights, Draft Resolution on Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and All Forms of Discrimination, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/L.40 (Apr. 20, 1999). Pakistan
had been repeatedly criticized for its own blasphemy laws. See, e.g., Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-
comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 50th Sess., 23d mtg. ] 45-48,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/SR.23 (Aug. 21, 1998).
13. Comm'n on Human Rights, 55th Sess., 61st mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/SR.61 (Oct.
19, 1999).
14. Id. 7.
15. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 1999/82, 55th Sess., 62d mtg. U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Res/1999/82 (Apr. 30, 1999).
16. Id. art. 1.
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related intolerance and discrimination towards Islam and any other religion."
17
Under this formulation, the objects of protection are Islam and other religions,
rather than individual adherents of religions. In international law,
discrimination on racial, ethnic, or religious grounds, however, is generally
understood to be directed against persons or groups of persons. 8 The
resolution did not elaborate on how the same concept could be applied to
religions, beliefs, or ideologies, or who would decide when a religion had
been defamed.
The Commission adopted a similar resolution by consensus in 2000,
after several draft resolutions and amendments, and protracted discussion'
9
with the European Union urging the sponsors not to raise the issue again in the
Commission. Unperturbed, Pakistan introduced another draft resolution in
2001. 21 This time, however, consensus proved elusive. The Belgian
representative, speaking on behalf of the EU, criticized the OIC for protecting
religions rather than the rights of individuals. 22 Nevertheless, the resolution
23
was adopted. The Commission also voted on resolutions on defamation of
religions in 2002,24 2003,25 2004,26 and 2005.27
Thus, defamation of religions and Islamophobia figured prominently on
the international agenda of Muslim states even prior to the publication of the
cartoons in September 2005. At that stage, no claims for additional legal
instruments were being made, and the issue was receiving a muted
institutional response within the United Nations 28 and little news coverage.
Once the cartoons were published, the campaign against defamation of
religions and Islamophobia garnered greater attention and was raised in
17. Id. art. 3.
18. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 1,
para. 1, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 212; Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, General Recommendation Concerning Article I of the Convention, 1, U.N. Doc.
A]54/18(Supp.), Annex V (Aug. 27, 1999).
19. Comm'n on Human Rights, 56th Sess., 67th mtg. 72-73, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/SR.67 (Dec. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Record of the 67th Meeting]; Comm'n on Human
Rights, Draft Resolution on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and All Forms of
Discrimination, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/L.18 (Apr. 10, 2000); Comm'n on Human Rights,
Draft Resolution on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and All Forms of Discrimination, 56th
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/L.96 (Apr. 20, 2000); Comm'n on Human Rights, Draft Resolution on
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and All Forms of Discrimination, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/L.6 (Apr. 5, 2000).
20. Record of the 67th Meeting, supra note 19, 75.
21. Comm'n on Human Rights, Draft Resolution on Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and All Forms ofDiscrimination, U.N. Doc. E/CN./200 I/L.7 (Apr. 11, 2001).
22. Comm'n on Human Rights, 57th Sess., 61st mtg. 1 4-6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/SR.61
(Dec. 4, 2001).
23. All European countries on the Commission as well as Canada, Japan, and the United
States voted against. Id. 1 10.
24. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2002/9, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Res/2002/9 (Apr. 15, 2002).
25. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2003/4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Res/2003/4 (Apr. 14, 2003).
26. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2004/6, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Res./2004/6 (Apr. 8, 2004).
27. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2005/3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Res/2005/3 (Apr. 12, 2005).
28. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Civil and
Political Rights, Including Religious Intolerance, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/63 (Feb. 13, 2001) (prepared
by Abdelfattah Amor). Special Rapporteur on Racism Doudou Diane had some sympathy for the claims
of defamation, but concluded that a stricter implementation of existing norms was needed. ECOSOC,
Comm'n on Human Rights, Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and All Forms of
Discrimination, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003123 (Jan. 3, 2003).
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additional fora. Yemen introduced a resolution condemning defamation of
religions in the U.N. General Assembly, which was adopted in a vote split
along the trenches established by the previous votes in the Commission on
Human Rights.29 The OIC held an Extraordinary Islamic Summit session in
Mecca in December 2005 to address the defamation campaigns against
Muslims and Islam itself. The assembled head of states expressed "concern at
rising hatred against Islam and Muslims and condemned the recent incident of
desecration of the image of the Holy Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) in the
media of certain countries" and emphasized "the inapplicability of using the
freedom of expression as a pretext to defame religions."
30
Over the next four years, defamation of religion was a constant topic at
international and regional meetings. The newly established Human Rights
Council decided at its first session to request reports on defamation of
religions by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion, by the Special
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, and by the High
Commissioner for Human Rights. 31 The reports were to focus on the
implications of defamation under Article 20(2) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which requires states party to prohibit by law
any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility, or violence. The reports, however, were cautious
about subsuming defamation under Article 20(2). 33
Representatives of Muslim countries therefore felt justified in insisting
on stronger remedies, suggesting that the Human Rights Council draft "a
legally binding instrument to combat defamation of religions and uphold
respect for religions and beliefs." ' 34 The OIC Summit conference in 2008
declared all acts "which defame Islam as heinous acts that require
punishment.' 35 The OIC authorized its Secretary-General to constitute a group
of experts to draft "a legally-binding international instrument to promote
respect for all religions and cultural values and prevent discrimination and
instigation of hatred vis-A-vis the followers of any religion."
36
At the same time, the OIC continued to press the issue of defamation at
the United Nations. Both the General Assembly and the Human Rights
29. G.A. Res. 60/150, 60th Sess., 64th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/150 (Dec. 16, 2005).
30. Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC], Final Communiqu6 of the Third
Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, at I1 (Dec. 7-8, 2005), available at
http://www.oic-oci.org/ex-summit/english/fc-exsumm-en.htm.
31. Human Rights Council Dec. 1/107, 24th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/DEC/l/107 (Nov. 13, 2006).
32. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20(2), entered into force Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
33. Human Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15
March 2006 Entitled "Human Rights Council,'" 47, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/3 (Sept. 20, 2006) (prepared
by Asma Jahangir & Doudou Diine); High Comm'r for Human Rights, Human Rights Council,
Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled "Human Rights
Council, " 19, 22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/6 (Sept. 20, 2006).
34. Human Rights Council, 2d Sess., 9th mtg. 24, 31, U.N. Doe. AIHRCI2/SR.9 (Oct. 25,
2006).
35. OIC, Final Communiqu6 of the Eleventh Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, 176,
OIC Doc. OIC/SUMMIT-I 1/2008/FC/Final (Mar. 13-14, 2008).
36. Id. 177.
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Council passed resolutions in 2007 and 2008.37 The OIC and the Groups of
Arab and African States also amended the resolution extending the mandate of
the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression to cover "instances in
which the abuse of the right of freedom of expression constitutes an act of
racial or religious discrimination." 38 The concept of defamation of religions,
now seemingly established on the international level, figured prominently on
the agenda of NGOs 39 and was reported by the media.
40
Proponents of defamation hoped to further entrench and codify the
concept at the U.N. Durban Review Conference scheduled for 2009.41 The
2001 World Conference against Racism in Durban had not addressed the issue
of religious defamation, but the Durban Programme of Action had
recommended preparing complementary international standards to strengthen
international instruments against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia,
and related intolerance. 42 To this end, the Council convened a group of experts
to analyze the gaps in existing international instruments and to deliberate on
the adoption of additional protocols or new conventions. An ad hoc
committee of Council members was then to implement their findings.44 When
the experts concluded that current legal instruments sufficiently covered the
combination of religious intolerance and racial prejudices, they were
chastised by Muslim member states for disregarding their mandate.46
This was arguably the high point of the push for international
defamation law. In March 2009, an extensive version of the obligatory
resolution was passed by the Council.47 Western countries feared and Muslim
37. G.A. Res. 62/154, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/154 (Dec. 18, 2007); G.A. Res. 63/171, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/63/171 (Dec. 18, 2008); Human Rights Council Res. 7/19, 40th mtg., U.N. Doc.
A!HRC/Res/7/19 (Mar. 28, 2008); Human Rights Council Res. 4/9, 31st mtg., U.N. Doc.
AIHRC/Res/4/9 (Mar. 30, 2007).
38. Human Rights Council Res. 7/36, art. 4(d), 42d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/36 (Mar.
28, 2008).
39. Human Rights Council, Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of
Intolerance, Follow-Up and Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme ofAction, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/10/NGO/69 (Feb. 26, 2009) (joint written statement submitted by Freedom House & the
Beckett Fund for Religious Liberty); Human Rights Council, Promotional Protection of All Human
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/9/NGO/15 (Aug. 29, 2008) (joint written statement submitted by ARTICLE 19 (The
International Centre Against Censorship) & the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies).
40. See, e.g., Bad Counsel, ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 2007, at 58-59 (referring to the 2007
defamation resolution as "new"); Zwischen Meinungsfreiheit und Hassreden: Der Uno-
Menschenrechtsrat debattiert fiber Religion [Between Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech: The UN
Human Rights Council Debates Religion], NEUE ZORCHER ZEITUNG, Sept. 28, 2006, at 7.
41. G.A. Res. 61/149, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/149 (Dec. 19,2006).
42. World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance, Durban, S. Afir., Aug. 31-Sept. 8, 2001, Report, at 71, 199, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12
(2001).
43. Human Rights Council Res. 1/5, 2, 24th mtg., U.N. Doc. AIHRC/RES/l/5 (June 30,
2006).
44. Human Rights Council Dec. 3/103, 3d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/3/103 (Apr. 23,
2007).
45. Human Rights Council, Intergovernmental Working Group on the Effective
Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, Complementary International
Standards, 130, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/WG.3/6 (Aug. 27, 2007).
46. Human Rights Council, Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and All Forms of
Discrimination, 23, 41,42, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/I0/88 (Feb. 24, 2009).
47. Human Rights Council Res. 10/22, 10th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/10/22 (Mar. 26,
2009).
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countries hoped that the Durban Review Conference would see a decade of
promoting religious defamation rewarded by the initiation of codification.48
Yet "defamation of religions" did not feature at all in the outcome document
of the Review Conference, despite Muslim states' insistence on the
importance and validity of the concept.49 Instead, the document underscored
the paramount importance of freedom of expression. 50 At the Review
Conference, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression had stated that
it was "crucial" to remove defamation from the final outcome document.
5 1
Eventually, the OIC accommodated the Western states' insistence on omitting
defamation.52 Clearly, this came as a surprise.53 As late as October 2008, the
proposals for the outcome document of the Review Conference had still made
numerous references to defamation and demanded new normative standards.
54
For some time after the Review Conference, defamation all but vanished
from the international agenda. The 1 1th and 12th sessions of the Human
Rights Council did not pass resolutions on defamation, but instead adopted a
compromise resolution on freedom of expression co-sponsored by Egypt and
the United States. 5 The end of defamation of religion seemed to be
imminent.56 While the OIC still pushed to draw up new legal instruments,57
the momentum on the international level seemed lost. Even if the OIC itself
adopted a new legal instrument, the effect would be limited since the
organization primarily takes issue with the treatment of Muslims in non-
Muslim states. It would seem that the representatives of OIC member states
were somewhat flushed with their influence in U.N. bodies. In the flood of
resolutions they overlooked that U.N. rapporteurs and experts consistently
argued against the need for new legal standards.
It is too soon to say whether this indicates the waning of defamation.
48. Neil MacFarquahr, Concerns Keep U.S. from Talks on Racism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2009, at A7.
49. Press Release, Durban Review Conference, Afternoon, at 2, U.N. Doc. RC/09/3 Rev. 1
(Apr. 20, 2009), http://www.un.org/durbanreview2009/coverage/pdf/20.04.09-meeting-summary-pm-
revl..en.pdf [hereinafter Durban Conference April 20 Afternoon]; Press Release, Durban Review
Conference, Morning, at 2, 6, U.N. Doc. RC/09/4 (Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.un.org/durbanreview
2009/coverage/pdf/21.04.09_meeting summaryamen.pdf.
50. Durban Review Conference, Geneva, Switz., Apr. 20-24, 2009, Report, at 6-7, 54, 58,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.211/8 (2009).
51. Press Release, Durban Review Conference, Afternoon, at 5, U.N. Doc. RC/09/lI1 Rev. ]
(Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.un.org/durbanreview2009/coverage/pdf/23.04.09_meeting-summarypm-
rev l.en.pdf.
52. Durban Conference April 20 Afternoon, supra note 49, at 3, 9; Closing Statement of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.un.org/durbanreview2009/stmt05
-01-09.shtml.
53. See, e.g., Avoiding the Worst: UN Conference on Racism, ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 2009, at
62-63.
54. Preparatory Comm. for Durban Review Conference, Implementation of the Mandate of the
Working Group, 46, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.21 I/PC/WG.2/CRP. I Annex (Oct. 27, 2008).
55. Human Rights Council Res. 12/16, 12th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/12/16 (Oct. 2,
2009).
56. ARTICLE 19, UN Human Rights Council: Beginning of the End for Defamation of
Religion? (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.articlel9.org/pdfs/press/un-human-rights-council-beginning-of
-the-end-for-defamation-of-religions-.pdf.
57. The working group to that end is still not established. OIC, Council of Foreign Ministers,
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Recent Developments
The OIC might well decide that the domestic benefits of passing annual
resolutions in the Human Rights Council outweigh the cost of antagonizing
the Western states. Muslim members of the Ad Hoc Committee continue to
insist that new legal instruments are indispensable. 58 New efforts are
underway to pass another resolution on defamation in the General Assembly
in 2010 with a view to drafting a binding instrument.59 Suddenly, defamation
of religions seems to be well and alive again.
But repetitive resolutions without result would underscore that nothing
beyond grandstanding can be achieved. Even if a new international instrument
or additional protocol were eventually to emerge at the United Nations, it is
unlikely that Western governments would feel compelled to become a party to
it. While indicating that they were not unsympathetic to complaints of
discrimination against Muslims, European regional institutions have also
made it clear that they do not see the prohibition of defamation of religions as
a viable solution to such grievances.
60
Defamation of religions will be with us for some time to come. But its
proponents have yet to provide a convincing rationale why-and especially
how-religions rather than individuals should be protected from insult or
discrimination. The mere fact that some Muslim countries impose severe
penalties for blasphemy cannot warrant a ban on the international level.6 1 Nor
is it clear who would authoritatively decide when a transgression has
occurred; courts would be ill-equipped to adjudicate religious commands. The
emancipation of the public sphere from control by religious authorities is too
important an achievement to be jeopardized by a vague, novel concept.
58. Human Rights Council, Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards,
Outcome Referred to in Paragraph 2(D) of the Road Map on the Elaboration of Complementary
Standards, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/AC.I/2/2 (Aug. 26, 2009).
59. Frank Jordans, Islamic Nations Pressing UN Panel for Treaty That Would Ban
Blasphemy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 20, 2009, at 7.
60. See Eur. Pail. Ass., Recommendation 1805, Blasphemy, Religious Insults and Hate Speech
Against Persons on Grounds of Their Religions (2007), http://assembly.coe.int/main.asplink=/
Documents/AdoptedText/ta07/EREC1805.htm; see also European Comm'n for Democracy Through
Law, Report on the Relationship Between Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion, 64, Doc.
No. CDL-AD(2008)026 (Oct. 23, 2008).
61. See Inhorn, supra note 4.
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